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1SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002: ARE MULTI-NATIONAL CORPORATIONS 
UNDULY BURDENED?
“Sarbanes-Oxley is the most important piece of legislation in the securities area 
since the New Deal.”1
- SEC Commissioner Harvey Goldschmid, 2004
I.  INTRODUCTION
The Sarbanes- Oxley Act (SOX) was signed into law on July 30, 2002.2  SOX was enacted in 
an effort to “restore confidence to the US capital markets.”3  The frauds of Enron, WorldCom, 
and other companies prompted Congress to pass legislation to end corruption in American 
markets.4 President Bush, in his speech before signing SOX, stated Corporate America would 
not be held to a different ethical standard than the rest of the United States.5  Even though SOX 
was enacted to deter corruption in the United States, the impact of the legislation was global.6
“Relevant legal developments in the United States . . . never go unnoticed in foreign 
jurisdictions.”7
1
 Harvey Goldschmid, Comm’r, Sec. Exch. Comm’n, Address at Columbia Business School: The Sarbanes Oxley 
Act: Too Little, Too Far, or Just Enough? (September 17, 2004), available at
http://www0.gsb.columbia.edu/leadership/news?&global.now=09-01-
2004&main.id=592069&main.ctrl=contentmgr.detail&main.view=news.detail.  
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 Bonnie K. Levitt, Sarbanes-Oxley Insider Trading Prohibitions Affect Insiders Outside the US, 14 INT’L CO. & 
COM. LAW REV. 293, 293 (2003).
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 Tom O’Neill, Bertrand Cardi, & Simon Charbit, Conflicts between French Law and Practice and the US Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002, 31 INT’L BUS. LAW. 59, 59 (2003).    
4
 Larry E. Ribstein, International Implications of Sarbanes-Oxley: Raising the Rent on U.S. Law 2 (Illinois Law and 
Economics Working Paper Series, Paper No. LE03-005, 2003), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/pape.tar?abstract_id=401660. [hereinafter Raising the Rent].  
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 George W. Bush, President of the U.S., Address at the signing of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (July 30, 2002), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/07/20020730-1.html.    
6
 Jonathan Shirley, Comment, International Law and the Ramifications of the Sarbanes--Oxley Act of 2002, 27 B.C. 
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 501, 511 (2004).  
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 Felix R Ehrat, Sarbanes-Oxley – A View from Outside, 31 INT’L BUS. LAW. 75 (2003).  
2SOX has implications for companies and corporations doing business in the United States 
and abroad.  Firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange are subject to the regulation under 
United States securities laws.8 Approximately fifteen percent of firms listed on the New York
Stock Exchange are domiciled outside of the United States.9 These companies include the Nokia 
Corporation domiciled in Finland,10 DaimlerChrysler Corporation domiciled in Germany,11 and 
Siemens Corporation also domiciled in Germany.12 This is a large group of firms controlled not 
only by United States securities laws, but also by regulations in their countries of domicile.  
Problems arise when the regulations under SOX and other United States securities regulations 
conflict with international corporate governance standards and regulations of individual 
countries.  
This comment examines the conflicts between SOX and corporate governance regulations 
outside of the United States, specifically in the European Union (emphasizing France and 
Germany), International Corporate Governance Regulations, and regulations under the World 
Trade Organization.  Section II provides an overview of SOX, the provisions effecting 
multinational companies, its’ background, and the reasoning behind the provisions.  Section III 
discusses the conflicts between the provisions of SOX and international corporate governance.  
Section IV discusses enforcement issues of both SOX and international corporate governance 
8
 Raising the Rent, supra note 4, at 2.
9
 Jordan Siegel, Can Foreign Firms Bond Themselves Effectively by Renting U.S. Securities Laws?, J. OF FIN. 
ECON., Feb. 2004, at 2, 2, available at http://www.afajof.org/pdfs/2003program/articles/siegel.pdf. This is a chart of 
the volume of foreign stocks on the New York Stock Exchange. 
http://www.nysedata.com/factbook/viewer_edition.asp?mode=chart&key=16&category=6.  
10
 New York Stock Exchange: Listed Company Directory, http://www.nyse.com/about/listed/6.html (last visited 
Nov. 6, 2005). 
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 New York Stock Exchange: Listed Company Directory
http://www.nyse.com/about/listed/6.html?&ListedComp=All&start=21&startlist=1&item=2&next=clicked&firsttim
e=done&default=2 (last visited Nov. 6, 2005).
12
 New York Stock Exchange: Listed Company Directory, 
http://www.nyse.com/about/listed/6.html?&ListedComp=All&start=41&startlist=1&item=3&next=clicked&firsttim
e=done&default=2 (last visited Nov. 6, 2005).
3regulations, including the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the United States as a matter of law and 
international comity concerns.  Section V discusses which form of governance has been more 
successful and the reasons for success.  Section VI is the conclusion.  
II. OVERVIEW OF SOX AND ITS PROVISIONS
A. Background of SOX
SOX was enacted in the wake of Enron, WorldCom, and other business scandals in the 
United States.13 Politicians feared the scandals would cripple American markets.14 The scandals 
had already resulted in billions of dollars of corporate losses and deeply harmed investor trust.15
Congress realized if they did not take swift action, the problem would spread throughout every 
sector of the economy.16  Congress felt most of the links in the chain, such as managerial 
controls for disclosure and between auditors and officers of a company, had failed and 
companies failed to deliver clean and honest information to investors.17
The Bush Administration was under immense pressure to push for a tough response of 
regulation after the Enron scandal.18 The explosion of the Enron scandal in the media led to over 
thirty “Enron-inspired” bills being contemplated on by Congress.19 By July 25, 2004, a final bill 
was passed by Congress and was signed into law by President Bush five days later.20
13
 Michael A. Perino, American Corporate Reform Abroad: Sarbanes-Oxley and the Foreign Private Issuer, 4 EUR. 
BUS. ORG. L. REV. 213 (2003), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=439501. 
14 Id.
15
 Information Guide to the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, http://www.sarbanes-oxley-101.com/sarbanes-oxley-
faq.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2005) [hereinafter Information Guide].
16
 Perino, supra note 13.    
17 DAVID E. HARDESTY, PRACTICAL GUIDE TO CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND ACCOUNTING: IMPLEMENTING THE 
REQUIREMENTS OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT xvi (2005 ed.) [hereinafter PRACTICAL GUIDE].
18
 Shirley, supra note 6, at 505.
19 Id.
20 Id.
4The scandals occurred because monitoring failed at several levels, including the 
monitoring of directors and at prominent accounting and law firms.21  SOX requires all publicly-
traded companies, domestic and multinational companies, to comply with regulations set out in 
the Act.22  SOX regulations try to improve corporate governance and corporate accountability by 
requiring honesty in financial reporting.23
B. Provisions of SOX
SOX includes provisions to “restore integrity to financial markets and confidence in 
corporate conducts, financial reports and related audit functions.”24 It creates new rules to 
“protect auditor independence and address conflicts of interest faced by securities analysts.”25
The provisions range from accounting procedures and enhanced disclosure to criminal sanctions 
for violating the regulations of SOX.26 These provisions have the goal of trying to get honest 
and detailed information to investors, without the taint of corruption or deceit.
1. Title III: Corporate Responsibility27
Sections 301 to 308 lay out the requirements for corporate responsibility under SOX.28
There are four relevant provisions under Title III: (1) the establishment of audit committees of 
public companies;29 (2) CEO and CFO certifications;30 (3) insider trades during pension fund 
blackout periods;31 and (4) the rules of professional conduct for attorneys.32
21 Raising the Rent, supra note 4, at 2.  
22
 Information Guide, supra note 15.  
23
 Pankaj K. Jain & Zabihollah Rezaee, Professors, U. of Mem., 2003 Financial Management Association Meeting, 
Denver, Colorado: Have the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 and CEO Certifications Made the Markets More 
Informed? (Oct. 8, 2003), available at http://207.36.165.114/Denver/Papers/sarbanes_spread.pdf.    
24 Id.
25
 William H. Donaldson, Chairman, Sec. Exchange Comm’n, Address at London School of Economics: U.S. 
Capital Markets in the Post-Sarbanes-Oxley World: Why Our Markets Should Matter to Foreign Issuers (Jan. 25, 
2005).
26
 Ehrat, supra note 7, at 75.
27 Sarbanes--Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107--204, § 307, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified as amended in 15 
U.S.C.A. §§ 7201-7266 and scattered sections of 11,18,28, and 29 U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 2003), available at
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/gwbush/sarbanesoxley072302.pdf [hereinafter The Act].
28 PRACTICAL GUIDE, supra note 17, at 301.  
5a. Section 301: Public Company Audit Committees33
The audit committees of public companies must be made up of independent directors.34
The requirements for the directors include taking charge of corporate audits and overseeing the 
auditors, resolving accounting disputes between auditors and management, and hearing and 
acting on complaints regarding accounting or internal control issues.35  The members of the audit 
committee must be independent; this means that the members  cannot receive any kind of 
compensation for advising or consulting from the issuer and must not be affiliated with the 
issuer.36
The purpose of this provision is to ensure the independence of auditors from
management.37  Congress realized before the enactment of SOX that many problems were due to 
“close ties between audit committee members and management.”38  The audit committee cannot 
owe their loyalty to the management of the company; it must be loyal to the company as a whole 
and the committee.39
b. Section 302: Corporate Responsibility for Financial Reports40
Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) and Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) are required to 
certify that the financial statements are truthful and contain no material misstatements.41  The 
statement shows the company has the required internal control over financial r eporting and 
29 PRACTICAL GUIDE, supra note 17, at 301.
30 Id. at 311.
31 Id. at 327.
32 Id. at 339.
33 The Act, supra note 27, § 301.
34 PRACTICAL GUIDE, supra note 17, at 301.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 305.
37 Id. at 302.
38 Id. at 301.
39 Id. at 302.
40
 The Act, supra note 27, § 302.
41 PRACTICAL GUIDE, supra note 17, at 311.
6disclosure procedures.42  Statements that must be certified under this section are forms 10-Q, 10-
K, 20-F, and 40-F.43
The 10-Q is a report filed quarterly to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).44
It includes an unaudited financial statement and shows the financial status of the firm.45  The 
report must be filed for the first three fiscal quarters and is due within 45 days of the end of the 
quarter.46  The 10-K provides a comprehensive outline of the firm’s business.47  The report must 
be filed within 90 days of the end of the fiscal year.48  The 20-F is the form for foreign private 
issuers to register with the SEC under Section 12(b) or 12(g) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934.49  It is also the form used for annual and transition reports for firms under Sections 13 and 
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.50 The 40-F is a registration statement under 
Section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or an annual report under Section 13(a) or 
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.51
Section 302 of SOX requires CEOs and CFOs to certify financial reports and requires
officers to review and verify that the reports are honest and do not contain misleading or false 
statements.52 This section requires certification to cover “review of the report, its material 
accuracy, the fair presentation of financial information, disclosure controls, and internal 
42 PRACTICAL GUIDE, supra note 17, at 311.
43 Id. at 312.  
44
 Definition of 10-Q, http://www.accounting-career-opportunity.com/accounting-terms-and-definition.html (last 
visited Nov. 6, 2005).  
45 Id.
46 Id.
47
 Definition of 10-K, http://www.accounting-career-opportunity.com/accounting-terms-and-definition.html (last 
visited Nov. 6, 2005).
48 Id.
49
 Security Lawyer’s Deskbook, http://www.law.uc.edu/CCL/34forms/form20-F.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2005).
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 PRACTICAL GUIDE, supra note 17, at 311.
7accounting controls.”53 CEOs and CFOs are held accountable for the financial statements and 
must sign the reviewed financial documents.54
c. Section 306: Insider Trades During Pension Fund Blackout Periods55
Corporate officers and directors are not allowed to trade in company stock during a 
“blackout period.”56 A blackout period is a “period of at least three days during which at least 
half of the company’s U.S. individual account plan participants are not permitted to trade the 
company stock within their plans.”57 Participants also receive at least 30 days notice prior to a 
blackout period.58
This provision emerged directly from the Enron scandal, where it was alleged that 
“employees held Enron stock in their individual retirement account plans and were prevented 
from selling the stock on account of a ‘blackout’”, and during that time their stock lost value.59
This provision only applies to issuers who maintain individual account plans.60
d. Section 307: Rules of Professional Responsibility for Attorneys61
Attorneys are required to report evidence of securities violations and any other fraudulent 
act to a company’s chief counsel or the CEO.62  The attorney must take the evidence to the board 
of directors if appropriate action is not taken.63  This process is known as “up-the-ladder 
53 GUY P. LANDER, WHAT IS SARBANES-OXLEY? 4 (2004).
54 PRACTICAL GUIDE, supra note 17, at 311.
55
 The Act, supra note 27, § 306.
56 PRACTICAL GUIDE, supra note 17, at 327.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 328.
61
 The Act, supra note 27, § 307.
62 PRACTICAL GUIDE, supra note 17, at 339.
63 Id.
8reporting.”64  The attorney has discretion to decide whether or not the company has appropriately 
responded to the report.65
The purpose of this provision is to hold attorneys accountable to the same standards as 
officers of a company.66 The attorney “owes his or her professional and ethical duties to the 
company as an organization, rather than to the company’s officers, directors, or employees.”67
Congress felt that previous regulations on attorneys were ineffective and did not deter attorney 
wrongdoing.68 This provision requires attorneys to report any material violation and be held 
accountable for not reporting violations.69
There is also a provision in this section labeled the “noisy withdrawal” regulation.70  This 
provision arises when the attorney does not receive a timely response to a report citing a material 
violation.71 The procedure differs for external attorneys working on a matter for a corporation 
and in-house attorneys working directly for the corporation.  An external attorney must withdraw 
from representing the corporation and notify in writing that the withdrawal is based on
professional considerations.72  An in-house attorney must stop working on the matter concerning 
the violation and notify the corporation in writing that there has not been an adequate response to 
their report.73
2. Title IV: Enhanced Financial Disclosures74
64 PRACTICAL GUIDE, supra note 17, at 340.
65 Id. at 340.
66 Id. at 339.
67 LANDER, supra note 53, at 91.  
68 PRACTICAL GUIDE, supra note 17, at 339.
69 Id. at 340.
70 Id. at 345.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74
 The Act, supra note 27, § 400.  
9Sections 401 to 409 lay out the requirements for financial disclosures under SOX.75
There are three relevant sections under Title IV: (1) the management assessment of internal 
controls;76 (2) the code of ethics for senior financial officers;77 and (3) real-time issuer 
disclosures.78
a. Section 404: Management Assessment of Internal Controls79
Annual reports of a public company are to be accompanied by a report on the 
effectiveness of internal control.80  Auditors are required to attest to management’s assessment of 
internal control.81  Management is responsible for ensuring that the internal control meets the 
requirements under SOX.82 These requirements include designing a system of internal control, 
supervised operation of the system, continuous monitoring of the system, and documentation of 
the internal controls implemented.83 The independent auditor of a company must also report on 
the company’s internal control over financial reporting.84 If the auditors cannot express an 
overall opinion about the effectiveness of a company’s internal control over financial reporting, 
the auditors must explain why.85  The management assessment of internal controls and also the 
auditor’s assessment must be included in the annual report.86
The purpose of this provision is to assure investors that companies have an effective 
internal control system.87 Before SOX, it was rare for companies to report on internal control.88
75 PRACTICAL GUIDE, supra note 17, at 401.
76 Id. at 418.
77 Id. at 427.
78 Id. at 436.
79
 The Act, supra note 27, § 404.
80 PRACTICAL GUIDE, supra note 17, at 418.  
81 Id.
82 Id. at 421.
83 Id. at 1603.
84 Id. at 423.
85 LANDER, supra note 53, at 19. 
86
 Amey Stone, Hardly Ready for Sarbanes-Oxley, BUS. WK., Sept. 20, 2004.  
87 PRACTICAL GUIDE, supra note 17, at 419.
88 Id.
10
This section holds management accountable for the internal control of a company and makes it 
public knowledge so investors know there is an internal control mechanism in place.89  It also 
places a burden on the auditors of a company to report on the internal control procedures and 
their effectiveness.90
b. Section 406: Code of Ethics for Senior Financial Officers91
Companies must disclose whether it has adopted a code of ethics for financial officers.92
For purposes of the provision, a code of ethics must be a written set of standards deterring 
violations and promoting honest conduct.93  Companies must include the code of ethics in their 
annual report.94
This provision shows investors whether a company has a written set of rules for financial 
officers.95 A company may also have different codes of ethics for different types of employees.96
The code may be part of a larger code addressing other issues and applying to additional 
persons.97 If a company does not have a code of ethics for financial officers, the company must 
state the reasons why they have not adopted a code.98 Also, if a company’s code of ethics is 
defective, they may not affirm that it has the required code. 99 A company must also report any 
change to the code and keep it updated.100
c. Section 409: Real-time Issuer Disclosures101
89 PRACTICAL GUIDE, supra note 17, at 420.
90 Id. at 423.
91
 The Act, supra note 27, § 406.
92 PRACTICAL GUIDE, supra note 17, at 427.
93 Id. at 428.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 427.
96 LANDER, supra note 53, at 66.  
97 Id.
98 PRACTICAL GUIDE, supra note 17, at 427.
99 LANDER, supra note 53, at 65.
100 PRACTICAL GUIDE, supra note 17, at 427.
101
 The Act, supra note 27, § 409.
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The SEC is “required to issue rules requiring ‘real-time’ disclosure of a number of key 
occurrences and transactions, which may be of importance to investors.”102 Issuers are required 
to disclose, in real-time, material changes and transactions.103 Events prompting the disclosure 
requirements have to be reported within two business days.104 The disclosure must also be in
English, it cannot be submitted in any other language even if a corporation is domiciled outside 
of the United States.105
The purpose of this provision is to disclose information of material changes of the 
financial condition of the company in a timely fashion.106 This leads to a constant flow of 
current information.  This provision is “necessary . . . for the protection of investors and in the 
public interest.”107
3. Title VIII: Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability108
Sections 801 to 807 lay out the punishment for violation of other provisions of SOX.109
A relevant provision under Title VIII deals with protection for employees who provide evidence 
of fraud.110
a. Section 806: Protection for Employees of Publicly Traded Companies Who 
Provide Evidence of Fraud111
This provision encourages “whistleblowing” by employees who report any violation of 
SOX.112  It also prohibits companies from retaliating against employees who have reported 
102 PRACTICAL GUIDE, supra note 17, at 436.
103 Id. at 438.
104 Id. at 436.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 The Act, supra note 27, § 800.
109 PRACTICAL GUIDE, supra note 17, at 801.
110 Id.
111
 The Act, supra note 27, § 806.
112 PRACTICAL GUIDE, supra note 17, at 811.
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securities law violations.113  This section can be implemented under Section 301, which requires 
audit committees to hear and act on reports of violations.114 The audit committee must have 
procedures to receive complaints regarding internal accounting measures and auditing issues.115
The committee must also set up a system to receive anonymous submissions by employees 
concerning question accounting and auditing procedures.116 All reports of violations are kept 
confidential.117
The purpose of this provision is to protect employees from being wrongfully terminated 
or disciplined for reporting violations.118 The employee has recourse if the company does take 
retaliatory action.  The employee can file a complaint with the Department of Labor and if the 
matter is not resolved within 80 days, the employee may file a suit against the company in
federal court.119
4. Title IX: White-Collar Crime Penalty Enhancements120
Sections 901 to 906 describe the criminal sanctions imposed on individuals within 
corporations who ignore the regulations of SOX.121  A relevant provision under Title IX of SOX 
deals with corporate responsibility for financial reports.122
a. Section 906: Corporate Responsibility for Financial Reports123
CEOs and CFOs are required to certify financial statements to comply with SOX.124 This 
provision requires “that financial statements comply with SEC reporting rules and that the 
113 Id.
114 PRACTICAL GUIDE, supra note 17, at 811.  Each audit committee must “establish procedures for: (1) the receipt, 
retention, and treatment of complaints received by the listed issuer . . . and (2) the confidential, anonymous 
submission by employees . . . of concerns regarding questionable accounting or auditing matters.” Id at 308.     
115 Id. at 308.
116 Id.
117 Id. at 811.
118 Id. at 812.
119 Id. at 811.  
120
 The Act, supra note 27, § 900.
121 PRACTICAL GUIDE, supra note 17, at 901.
122 Id. at 904.
123
 The Act, supra note 27, § 906.
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statements fairly present, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations 
of the company.”125  This section states the penalties for not complying with section 906 and also 
Section 302.126  The penalty imposed for certification of statements that officers know to be 
inaccurate includes imprisonment and monetary fines.127
The certification must accompany periodic financial statements submitted to the SEC.128
The periodic statements included under this section are forms 10-K, 10-Q, 20-F, and 40-F, which 
were defined earlier.129 Section 906 also makes it easier for prosecutors to build a case against 
executives who issue false or misleading financial statements.130 Section 906 is called the 
“criminal” certification for CEOs and CFOs.131
III. SOX: CONFLICTS WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW
SOX has implications for companies doing business in the United States and abroad.132
However, only companies listed on United States exchanges are affected.133  “More than 1300 
foreign corporations that list securities on U.S. exchanges are affected.”134 Not all provisions of 
SOX conflict with international corporate governance, but there are many provisions that do.
A. Sections of SOX Conflicting with International Law 
124 PRACTICAL GUIDE, supra note 17, at 904.
125 PRACTICAL GUIDE, supra note 17, at 904.
126 Id.
127 Id.  A person who certifies a financial statement knowing that the report accompanying the financial statement 
does not comply with the regulations under this provision will be fined no more than 1 million dollars and 
imprisoned for not more than 10 years, or both.  Id at 905.  A person who willfully certifies a financial statement 
knowing the report does not comply with the requirements under this provision will be fined no more than 5 million 
dollars or imprisoned for not more than 20 years, or both. Id at 905.    
128 LANDER, supra note 53, at 8.
129 Id.
130 PRACTICAL GUIDE, supra note 17, at 904.
131 LANDER, supra note 53, at 8.
132
 Shirley, supra note 6, at 511.  
133 Id.
134 Id.
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Section 301 of SOX deals with the formation of public company audit committees and 
who comprises them.135  This provision makes it difficult for foreign companies, most of who are 
controlled by few shareholders.136 The audit committee must be staffed by completely 
independent members.137
This requirement of independent members on the audit committee raises problems for 
many companies.  For companies who are controlled by a few large shareholders, SOX excludes 
major shareholders who may insist on more of a voice in the audit committee.138  In a foreign 
company, one member may represent majority shareholders as an observer.139
The formation of an audit committee may also lead to unnecessary expenses for firms 
with only one or a few controlling shareholders.140  In this type of firm, the main problem is 
“controlling shareholders’ oppression of minority shareholders rather than managerial agency 
costs.”141 The independent audit committee is valuable in helping shareholders judge 
management by ensuring quality auditing of the firm.142 Differences in the quality of auditing 
are likely to be ineffective against shareholder opportunism.143 These additional decision-
making costs are likely to outweigh the benefits in multinational firms.144  The costs are based on 
the increased amount of time it takes to file the relevant forms and also firms who accrue
additional outside professional costs.145
135 PRACTICAL GUIDE, supra note 17, at 301.
136 Raising the Rent, supra note 4, at 28.
137 Id.
138 Id. at 9.
139 Id.
140 Id. at 10.
141 Id. at 10.
142 Raising the Rent, supra note 4, at 10.
143 Id. at 10.
144 Id. at 10.
145 Estelle M. Sohne, The Impact of Post--Enron Information Disclosure Requirements Imposed Under U.S. Law on 
Foreign Investors, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 217, 230 (2003).
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Section 301 can directly conflict with laws of many countries, especially those countries 
who have a civil law system.146  Many countries with civil law systems, including France and 
Germany, require “two-tier” boards.147  The “upper” board (supervisory board) must be at least 
half comprised of labor managers and the “lower” board (managing board) is typically 
comprised of insider executives.148 The requirement also creates conflicts with the status of 
internal and external auditors.149  In Italy, Japan, and Brazil, the local laws provide “for a 
statutory board of auditors that must be independent of the board of directors itself (thus 
precluding an audit committee comprised of ‘independent directors’)”.150 French companies are 
regulated by “two independent institutes, the Ordre des Experts-Comptables (National Institute 
for Chartered Accountants) and the Compagnie Nationale des Commissaires aux Comptes 
(National Institute for Statutory Auditors).”151 French companies wonder why they have to abide 
by the regulations of SOX and also regulations under French oversight boards.152 It is standard 
practice in most European countries for shareholders to directly appoint outside auditors, not by 
a special committee of independent directors.153
Civil law corporations have generally resisted giving the supervisory board important 
substantive responsibilities, because employee representatives serve on the board.154 Under 
SOX, labor representatives would be given great responsibility, because “the audit committee 
146
 Kenji Taneda, Survey: Sarbanes-Oxley, Foreign Issuers and United States Securities Regulation, 2003 COLUM. 
BUS. L. REV. 715, 739 (2003).  
147 Id. at 739.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Id.
151
 John Paul Lucci, Enron – The Bankruptcy Heard Around the World and the International Ricochet of Sarbanes-
Oxley, 67 ALB. L. REV. 211, 240 (2003).  
152 Id. at 240.
153
 Taneda, supra note 146, at 739.
154
 Minodora D. Vancea, Exporting U.S. Corporate Governance Standards through the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: 
Unilateralism or Cooperation?, 53 DUKE L. J. 833 (2001), available at
http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dlj/articles/dlj53p833.htm.
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must be staffed with members of the supervisory committee, including labor representatives.”155
The conflict between SOX and a civil system of government also makes it impossible for 
companies in those countries to “comply with both the codetermination requirement imposed by 
their country of incorporation and the independence requirement imposed by the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act.”156 Most members of the supervisory board, required under codetermination, are not 
considered independent under United States law.157 The SEC does have an exemption for this 
circumstance, but foreign companies are uneasy about increasing labor representatives’ 
bargaining power.158
Section 302 of SOX ensures corporate responsibility by requiring CEOs and CFOs to 
certify financial statements published by a company.159 This provision has caused immediate 
concern, especially in European companies.160 There are no corresponding requirements in 
English or Swiss law.161 In French law, it is only the CEO who certifies financial statements and 
not the CFO.162  In Germany, corporations have the governance structure of two tiers consisting 
of a management board, Vorstand, and a supervisory board, Aufsichstrat.163  The executive with 
responsibilities most analogous to the CEO of an American company is a member of the 
155
 Vancea, supra note 154, at 841.
156 Id.
157
 17 C.F.R. § 240.10A-3(b)(1), available at
http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/12feb20041500/edocket.access.gpo.gov/cfr_2004/aprqtr/pdf/17cfr240.10A-
3.pdf.  “Each member of the audit committee must be a member of the board of directors of the listed issuer.” Id.
“An affiliate of the company is not independent for audit committee purposes.” Vancea, supra note 154, n.47.  “An 
affiliate is defined as someone that ‘controls, or is controlled by, or is under common control with’ the company.” 
Id.
158
 Vancea, supra note 154, at 842.  The exemption is that foreign employee representatives on the supervisory 
board are allowed to be part of the audit committee, even though they are not independent of the company’s 
executives. Id.
159 PRACTICAL GUIDE, supra note 17, at 311.
160
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management board.164  There is also not a member of the management board who all other 
employees and executives report to and are subordinate to.165  The members of the management 
board represent the company equally.166
The requirement of CEO and CFO certification creates problems with firms operating 
outside of the United States, primarily because the process of certification can be time 
consuming.167 Executives of many foreign issuers are greatly disadvantaged, because they are 
not accustomed to United States disclosure standards and practices.168 An example of the 
disadvantage can be seen in the “materially accurate” standard for certification of financial 
statements under section 302.169  Materiality is a concept central to United States securities laws, 
but foreign firms are unsure of the standard and if it has been met.170 In countries of the 
European Union (EU), the term “price sensitive” is used, but this is only a similar standard, not 
an exact one.171 The SEC has made an exception for foreign firms so they only have to make 
this certification once annually.172 This provision is not burdensome for sophisticated foreign 
firms, but for all others it can be very burdensome.173
Section 306 regulates insider trades during pension fund blackout periods.174 “When 
blackouts affect a significant percentage of US participants in certain retirement plans, than all 
164
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trading by insiders, including insiders of the non-US issuer, is prohibited.”175 This provision 
specifically applies to multinational corporations as well as domestic corporations.  Foreign 
private issuers, for the purposes of this section, are defined as any foreign private issuer other 
than a foreign government and having more than fifty per cent of the issuer’s outstanding voting 
securities directly or indirectly held by residents in the United States.176 The test applied to a 
foreign issuer is more stringent than the test applied to domestic corporations.177
The test applied to corporations under this provision is the fifty per cent test.178 This test 
is applied by comparing “the number of affected participants and beneficiaries located within the 
United States and its territories who will be restricted with the total number of participants and 
beneficiaries in all of the issuer’s relevant US individual account plans.”179  Foreign corporations 
are also subjected to an additional test.  The additional test is a calculation made to confirm 
either that at least fifteen per cent of the beneficiaries and participants in the corporation’s 
relevant worldwide individual account plans are affected by the blackout and more than 50,000 
United States plan participants are affected.180 Also, for the purpose of foreign corporations, the 
definition of a “director” is limited to directors who are also management employees.181
Section 307 requires attorneys to report any security violations to the company, so that 
the situation may be resolved.182 This provision affects attorneys practicing in the United States, 
but also applies to any attorney outside the United States working for multinational firms falling 
under SOX regulations, unless the attorney falls under any of the exceptions listed in the 
175
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section.183  The SEC, after receiving many complaints from multinational firms, included a 
definition for “non-appearing foreign attorney” which excludes most lawyers who do not 
practice in the United States.184 Non-appearing foreign attorneys are attorneys who are admitted 
to practice law outside of the United States, do not hold themselves out as giving advice on or 
practicing American law, and conduct activities that are incidental to a foreign law practice or in 
consultation with United States counsel.185 The rule, however, does not apply when foreign 
attorneys are rendering their advice when consulting with counsel practicing in the United 
States.186
The provisions for regulating attorneys under SOX may conflict with international rules 
and rules of individual countries.187 In Germany, secrecy is mandated not only by the 
professional rules but also by the penal code.188  Another problem faced by attorneys of 
multinational corporations is that attorneys that practice law outside of the United States may be 
unfamiliar with violations of United States securities laws.189  How can the SEC expect foreign 
attorneys to report material violations of United States securities laws if they lack expertise in 
that area of law?190  Foreign firms also argue the “noisy withdrawal” provision may constitute a 
breach of attorney-client privilege.191  The SEC does try to alleviate some of the concerns of 
multinational corporations and foreign issuers by excluding most foreign attorneys, not licensed 
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184
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to practice law in the United States, from its coverage.192  “As a general matter, only foreign 
attorneys who provide advice regarding US securities law may still be subject to the rule.”193
Section 404 regulates management’s assessment of internal controls.194  SOX makes no 
distinction between corporations that are completely domestic and multinational corporations 
doing business in the United States and abroad.195 There is a later compliance date for 
multinational corporations, but that is the only dissimilarity in the rule.196  Many executives of 
multinational firms are unhappy with Section 404 of SOX.  According to a survey conducted by 
PricewaterhouseCoopers in June of 2003, only thirty percent of executives of multinational 
corporations had a favorable opinion of the provision.197
This provision has many implications for multinational corporations.  Before SOX, 
management was not required to have extensive internal control expertise.198 The business 
environments in certain regions are less focused on controls; examples include Asia, Latin 
America, and Europe.199 This lack of expertise and focus leads to an increase in the amount of 
work needed to comply with Section 404 of SOX.200
Another problem for multinational corporations is the form of the organization.  
Multinational corporations have a “decentralized organizational model.”201 This type of 
corporation may only receive financial statements from their subsidiaries once or twice a year 
192
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making it very difficult for these corporations to report to the SEC in a timely fashion.202 There 
are also language barriers to consider when having to report to the SEC.203  Many corporations 
have found that the English language is not always an effective medium of communication.204
SOX also requires corporations to use Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
(GAAP).205 Section 108 of SOX requires corporations to use GAAP standards when preparing 
financial statements.206  Traditionally, multinational firms used United States GAAP specialists 
to conform financial statements to comply with SOX regulations.207 Section 404 requires reports 
filed by companies under the provisions of SOX must conform to GAAP standards.208
Corporations are required to demonstrate that they have the appropriate experience ; they cannot 
rely on external sources to “fix” financial statements to conform to GAAP standards.209  “The 
independent auditor’s independence is impaired if they are considered to be a part of the
company’s system internal control.”210
This provision can be especially burdensome for foreign issuers and multinational 
corporations whose principal place of business is outside of the United States.211  In many 
jurisdictions outside of the United States, there are a limited amount of audit partners that 
possess the requisite knowledge of GAAP standards.212  In addition, most large multinational 
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corporations require “line” partners to complete their audits.213  Developing “line” partners, who 
can maintain the level of experience needed by the corporation, is “costly, difficult, and time 
consuming.”214 Audit firms are also severely limited in their ability to fill critical partner roles 
for these clients.215  This could decrease the quality of work done by these firms and defeat the 
purpose for implementing this provision.216
Section 406 requires corporations to adopt a code of ethics or to state why they have not 
adopted a code of ethics.217 This provision applies to domestic firms and foreign private 
issuers.218 The distinction between domestic firms and foreign private issuers under this section 
is that foreign p rivate issuers do not have to provide a current report of a change in the issuer’s 
code of ethics.219 A foreign private issuer only has to disclose changes once a year in its annual 
report.220
The Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) has provisions 
for a code of ethics to build public trust.221 It is not mandated that corporations  adopt of code of 
ethics, but the code will aid the process of corporate governance and encourage the reporting of
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unethical behavior.222  Almost all of the countries in the OECD also use training programs to 
raise awareness of ethical issues.223
Section 409 requires “real-time” disclosure of a number of key occurrences and 
transactions, which may be of importance to investors.224  This presents a complication for 
foreign issuers and multinational corporations.225  Time zone differences could affect the 
disclosure by corporations headquartered outside of the United States.226  The requirement that 
all disclosed documents must be in English presents a unique problem for foreign issuers whose 
first language is not English.227  This provision could lead to increased costs for document 
translation and other factors arising from the language barrier.228
Section 806 prohibits employers from taking adverse action against an employee when 
they take “lawful actions to disclose information or otherwise assist criminal investigators, 
federal regulators, Congress, supervisors . . . or parties in a judicial proceeding in detecting and 
stopping fraud.”229  There are many implications for multinational corporations under this 
section.  The differences of corporate culture in America and other countries can lead to conflicts 
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in reporting misconduct.230  There are many countries where whistleblowing is seen as a return to 
the government intruding on the business practices of corporations.231  In countries such as Italy 
and France, it sparks memories of experiences with collaborators during World War II.232 Even 
with this section of SOX, many employees outside of the United States will be hesitant to report 
violations.233
The whistleblowing provision of SOX conflicts with the EU Data Protection Law.234 In 
complying with SOX, many corporations have established telephone hotlines or even a 
complaint system where employees can make anonymous complaints on the internet.235  The 
submissions may contain information about fellow employees and management.236 The EU data 
protection laws are very strict in the circumstances for the collection and disclosure of personal 
information.237
Article 26, Section 2 of the 1995 European Parliament Directive on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of data, states:
Without prejudice to paragraph 1, a Member State may authorize a transfer or a set of transfers of 
personal data to a third country which does not ensure an adequate level of protection within the 
meaning of Article 25 (2), where the controller adduces adequate safeguards with respect to the 
protection of the privacy and fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals and as regards the 
exercise of the corresponding rights; such safeguards may in particular result from appropriate 
contractual clauses.238
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This article lays out the protection for individuals in the EU and the restrictions of processing 
information and sending it to non-EU countries.239 The directive also requires that “the 
processing of personal information must not adversely affect the personal freedom of 
individuals, and imposes consent and disclosure requirements.”240
The SOX whistleblowing provision conflicts with laws outside of the United States and 
these conflicts can be seen in a German labor court decision and a decision by the French 
National Commission for Data Protection and the Liberties.241 The French decision was based 
on the French data protection law.242  The decision prohibited two companies, McDonald’s and 
CEAC Exide Technology, from setting up anonymous reporting systems.243 The reporting 
systems, “hotlines”, were deemed to be illegal in France.244 The Commission Nationale de 
L’informatique et des Libertes (CNIL) found there to be a lack of transparency due to the fact a 
whistleblower’s allegations against another employee may not be accessible to the target of the 
allegations.245  The commission also found the hotlines to be a breach of ethics and unfair to 
employees accused, because they would not have the means to defend themselves or oppose 
proceedings which may involve criminal sanctions.246  This result creates a legal bind for 
companies: how can you implement SOX when it conflicts with local laws of countries where 
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business is being done?247  Christopher Kuner, an attorney with the Hunton & Williams law firm 
based in Brussels, made this conflict clear when he stated companies are being told “I either have 
to chop off my left hand or my right hand.”248
The German case was a decision handed down by the Fifth Division of the Wuppertal 
Labor Court on June 15, 2005.249 The court held Wal-Mart had to discontinue use of an 
employee complaint hotline for German employees until an agreement could be reached.250 The 
court also held provisions of the code of conduct implemented by Wal-Mart were invalid under 
German law.251  The court found Wal-Mart did not did not request consent of the works council 
of Wal-Mart.252  The court also founded their decision on German data protection laws.253
German data protection law “does not recognise an intra-group privilege for the transfer of 
data.”254 “Where the data is ultimately transferred to the United States, either the EC 
Commission standard contractual clauses have to be implemented or the U.S. company has to 
certify according to the Safe Harbor regulations.”255
247
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Section 906 imposes criminal sanctions on CEOs and CFOs who file misleading or false 
financial statements.256  This provision seems to conflict or overlap with regulations imposed by 
the International Organization for Standardization (ISO).257  Under the ISO provisions, dishonest 
reports and fraudulent quality systems are criminalized.258  With this level of regulation, it might 
be viewed as creating too much of a burden of suspicion on top management and seems to put a 
magnifying glass to companies who are registered under the ISO and are also subject to SOX
regulations.259
IV. ENFORCEMENT ISSUES OF SOX
SOX affects all companies listed on any stock exchange in the United States.260  The Act 
directly affects “management, audit committees, public company auditors, attorneys, and 
brokerage firms.”261 SOX affects companies operating domestically in the United States and 
also multinational companies, including foreign companies cross-listing on the United States 
stock exchanges.262  Harvey L. Pitt, Chairman of the SEC, has spoken on the issue of the 
extraterritoriality.263  He stated “‘We are aware of the fact that [many of the Act’s] requirements .
. . can conflict with internal corporate structures and legal requirements in home 
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257
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jurisdictions.’”264  He urged any effected party to “‘let us know when our proposals conflict with 
local law or local stock exchange requirements. . . . [W]e do promise to listen, . . . and do our 
best to harmonize the application of our rules with foreign sovereign requirements.’”265
A. Extraterritoriality Problems of SOX
The United States assertion of SOX in the global forum has created controversy all over 
the world.266 SOX was applauded domestically, but was greatly criticized interna tionally.267
SOX was criticized for “being made applicable to all foreign issuers listed on a U.S. exchange, 
even though some of the behavior the Act targeted was either a non-issue in foreign countries or 
was already efficiently regulated.”268
1. Statutory Enforcement Power under SOX
The statutory enforcement language of SOX can be found in Section Three of the Act.269
Section Three is entitled “Commission Rules and Enforcement.”270 It covers both regulatory 
actions of the commission and enforcement powers.271 The term “commission” means the 
SEC.272 Under this provision, the SEC “shall promulgate such rules and regulations, as may be 
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors, and in 
furtherance of this Act.”273
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The enforcement provision can be found in Section Three of SOX.274 The enforcement 
provision states,
A violation by any person of this Act, any rule or regulation of the Commission issued 
under this Act, or any rule of the Board shall be treated for all purposes in the same manner as a 
violation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C 78a et seq.) or the rules and 
regulations issued thereunder, consistent with the provisions of this Act, and any such person shall 
be subject to the same penalties, and to the same extent, as for a violation of that Act or such rules 
or regulations.275
This provides a broad grant of jurisdictional authority for the SEC and Department of Justice to 
impose criminal and civil sanctions under the requirements contained in SOX.276
2. United States Assertion of Exterritorial Jurisdiction
The assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction by the United States has been criticized by
the international community.277 Extraterritorial jurisdiction is defined as:
. . . the operation of a U.S. law so as to encompass activities where (1) the conduct at issue occurs 
within the U.S., but its effects take place abroad; (2) the conduct occurs abroad, but its effects take 
place in the U.S.; or (3) both the conduct and its effect occur abroad.278
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state, the extent to which other states regulate such activities, and the degree to which the 
desirability of such regulation is generally accepted.
(d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt by the regulation;
(e) the importance of the regulation to the international political, legal, or economic system;
30
SOX is concerned with the conduct that takes place in the United States, but the effects are felt
abroad.279  The Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States describes 
the link between territoriality and nationality:
International law recognizes links of territoriality, Subsection (1), and nationality, Subsection (2), 
as generally justifying the exercise of jurisdiction to prescribe. But these links are not sufficient in 
all cases: not all activities within a state’s territory, nor all activities of a state’s nationals, may 
reasonably be subjected to its legislation.280
However, this is a rule stated in a Restatement of the law and does not bind any court 
until it adopts the rule.281
Jurisdiction is the “power of a sovereign to affect the rights of persons, whether by 
legislation, by executive decree, or by the judgment of a court.”282  This definition lays out the 
principle that a “State has the right to exercise jurisdiction within the limits of its sovereignty, 
but is not entitled to encroach upon the sovereignty of other States.”283 International law 
imposes “limits on the ability of states to encroach on the sovereignty of other states by 
delineating the acceptable bases for asserting jurisdiction.”284
There are two types of limitations used by the United States courts in determining the 
extent of jurisdiction.285  The limitations applied by the courts are the subject matter test and 
(f) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of the international 
system;
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the activity; and
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state).
279
 Vancea, supra note 154, at 835.
280 RESTATEMENT, supra note 278, at §402.
281
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 Joseph H. Beale, The Jurisdiction of a Sovereign State, 36 HARV. L. REV. 241, 241 (1923).  
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prescriptive test to determine jurisdiction.286  These limitations are in addition to the limitations 
set by international law.287
The subject matter test for United States extraterritoriality is based on two 
presumptions.288 The first presumption is that acts of Congress are not to be construed in 
violation of international law.289 This presumption is known as the Charming Betsy
presumption.290 The presumption recognizes the potential for international conflict created by 
violations of international law and is used to determine vague congressional intent.291 The 
second presumption is imposed under a canon of construction stating “legislation of Congress, 
unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the 
United States.”292  This presumption is known as the Foley Bros. presumption.293 To discern 
Congressional intent the Supreme Court relied upon three factors: (1) the absence of an 
expressed intent that the statute apply to foreign companies;294 (2) the legislative history of the 
statute;295 (3) administrative decisions.296
3. Extraterritoriality of Securities Regulation before SOX
286
 Vancea, supra note 154, at 848.
287 Id.  The Supreme Court laid out the appropriate sources of international law when it stated international law “may 
be ascertained by consulting the works of jurists, writing professedly on public law; or by the general usage and 
practice of nations; or by judicial decisions recognizing and enforcing that law.” Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 
876, 880 (quoting United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160-61 (1820)).   
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The extraterritoriality of securities regulations is not a drastic or new idea; corporations 
outside of the United States have been subjected to United States securities regulations for quite 
some time.297  The first case examining the scope of Securities regulation outside of the United 
States was in Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, a case that was filed in 1968.298  Schoenbaum was a 
controversy over whether the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 applied to a Canadian oil 
company, listed on an American stock exchange that was engaging in insider trading.299  The 
district court granted summary judgment to defendants on the grounds that the complaint failed 
to state a claim under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.300 The Court of 
Appeals reversed in part and affirmed in part.  The Court of Appeals stated: 
. . . plaintiff stockholder’s allegations that majority stockholder, knowing true value of 
corporation’s stock, used its control over corporation to acquire 500,000 shares at a vastly 
inadequate price shortly before public announcement of corporation’s oil discovery required that 
plaintiff be permitted through discovery to develop evidence to counter defense affidavits, but that 
where it appeared that negotiations for purchase of treasury stock by other defendant were at arm’s 
length and that purchaser, and those whom it represented, were unable to bring any pressure on 
corporation to sell its stock at price below its true value, purchaser was entitled to dismissal of 
action against it.301
The court reversed on the issue of extraterritoriality, but decided that the insiders had not 
engaged in illegal insider trading regardless of their decision on the extraterritoriality 
argument.302  This decision found the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 applied 
extraterritorially.303  The case also created the “effects” test under federal securities laws.304
297
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300 Schoenbaum, 405 F.2d at 215.  Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 deals with manipulative and 
deceptive devices. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j (West 2000).  This provision is used to protect the public interest and also the 
investors of corporations. Id.
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 Vancea, supra note 154, at 850.  See also Kohn v. American Metal Climax Inc.,489 F.2d 262 (New York based 
insiders of a Zambian firm, who listed on and American stock exchange, had violated disclosure laws; court found 
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4. International Comity Considerations
Comity is a term used in international law when dealing with relations between the 
United States and other nations.305  It is described as an “informal principle that nations will 
extend certain courtesies to other nations, particularly by recognizing the validity and effect of 
their executive, legislative, and judicial acts.”306  This issue is most frequently raised by the 
courts, which should not “act in a way that demeans the jurisdiction, laws or judicial decisions of 
another country.”307  The courts have adopted multiple balancing tests to address questions of 
comity and extraterritorality desiring to avoid undue intrusion into the business and affairs of 
other countries.308
An important case in setting out the United States view of comity is the Supreme Court 
decision of Hartford Fire Insurance Company v. California.309  This case involved the 
(Dutch company listed on United States stock exchange sued for making financial misstatements; court found 
jurisdiction).
304 United States v. Aluminum Company of America, 148 F.2d 416, 444 (2d Cir. 1945) (Judge Learned Hand 
adopted the “effects” test; the court held the Sherman Act applied to foreign firms if their conduct affected the 
United States).  For the “effects” test you must look “whether the transaction or conduct has, or can reasonably be 
expected to have, a substantial effect on a securities market in the United States for securities of the same issuer or 
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jurisdiction of the Sherman Antitrust Act over foreign reinsurers.310  The Supreme Court held 
that the Sherman Act did have extraterritorial jurisdiction over foreign reinsurers under 
principles of international comity.311 The main issue the court struggled with was whether the 
provisions of the Sherman Act were in direct conflict with foreign law.312  Reinsurers from 
London argued that the Sherman Act conflicted with British Law.313  It was well settled law 
before this case was decided that the Sherman Act applied to conduct by foreign parties that 
produced a substantial effect in the United States.314  The court found that there was no conflict 
with British law.315  The court also found that “where  a person subject to regulation by two states 
can comply with the laws of both.”316
5. Extraterritoriality of SOX
SOX regulations apply to all companies listed on any United States exchange regardless 
of whether it is a domestic or foreign company.317  In some instances, however, SOX makes it 
impossible to comply with laws in countries outside the United States.318  A good example is 
Australia; under Australian corporate law, shareholders select the auditor instead of a committee 
like required under SOX.319  This is a situation where the regulation under SOX directly conflicts 
310 Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 509 U.S. at 764.  The Sherman Antitrust Act was passed in 1980 to disband 
existing monopolies and not let any more arise in their place. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7.     
311 Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 509 U.S. at 764.  
312 Id. at 798.
313 Id. at 798.
314 Id  at 795.  See also Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 582, n. 6 (1986)
(American television manufacturers could not recover antitrust damages against Japanese television manufacturers 
for any conspiracy by the Japanese manufacturers since such conduct could not injure the American manufacturers 
who stood to gain from any such conspiracy); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir.
1945) (Judge Learned Hand adopted the “effects” test; the court held the Sherman Act applied to foreign firms if 
their conduct affected the United States); RESTATEMENT § 415 (Any agreement in restraint of United States trade 
that is made in the United States, and any conduct or agreement in restraint of such trade that is carried out in 
significant measure in the United States, are subject to the jurisdiction to prescribe of the United States, regardless of 
the nationality or place of business of the parties to the agreement or of the participants in the conduct).
315 Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 509 U.S. at 798.
316 Id. at 798 (citing RESTATEMENT § 403).
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with the law of a host country, and falls specifically under the comity concerns raised in 
Hartford Fire Insurance Co..320
SOX specifically regulates all firms listing on a United States exchange regardless of 
whether they are a domestic or foreign company.321  SOX regulates these companies by using 
specific language out of the Act.  Extraterritoriality can be found under the language of SOX, by 
using the specific language of enforcement provisions, which make no distinction between 
domestic and foreign firms.322  This can be analogized to the Supreme Court’s holding in 
Hartford Fire Insurance Co..323 The court talks about a type of jurisdiction relevant to the 
extraterritorial reach of a statute known as “legislative jurisdiction” or “jurisdiction to 
prescribe”.324 When deciphering the jurisdiction issue, look to the intent of the legislature for 
guidance.325  The courts have consistently held that the legislation of Congress, unless a contrary 
intent appears, is meant to only apply in the territory of the United States.326  The enforcement 
language under SOX327 would seem to indicate that Congress meant for the Act to apply to all 
companies listed on a United States Exchange, both foreign and domestic.328
To discern the Congressional intent behind SOX, look to the legislative history behind 
the Act.329  Members of Congress were very reluctant in imposing SOX regulations on countries 
whose corporate responsibility frameworks were adequate or superior to the corporate 
320 Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 509 U.S. at 798.  If the British law would have been in direct conflict with the 
Sherman Act, then a comity issue would have arisen. Id.
321
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322
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323 Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 509 U.S. at 798.
324 Id. (citing E.E.O.C. v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. at 253).  This case held that Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act does not apply extraterritorially. E.E.O.C., 499 U.S. at 244.
325 Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 509 U.S. at 798.  
326 Id  at 798 (quoting E.E.O.C. v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. at 248).  
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responsibility framework of the United States.330  Senator Enzi, during a discussion on the Senate 
floor, stated:
While foreign issuers can be listed and traded in the U.S. if they agree to conform to GAAP and 
New York Stock Exchange rules, the SEC historically has permitted the home country of the 
issuer to implement corporate governance standards. Foreign issuers are not part of the current 
problems being seen in the U.S. capital markets, and I do not believe it was the intent of the 
conferees to export U.S. standards disregarding the sovereignty of other countries as well as their 
regulators.331
Senator Enzi’s opinion shows that at least some of the lawmakers behind the passage of 
SOX desired the legislation to only regulate companies in the United States, because 
foreign companies were not part of the scandals leading up to the passage of this bill.332
V. SUCCESS OF SOX
The question asked by companies both in the United States and abroad is whether SOX 
has had a positive effect on securities markets around the world or if it has imposed too great of a 
regulation.  When SOX was implemented in 2002, an international outcry from many 
multinational corporations and foreign firms rang out claiming that SOX was ineffective and that 
Congress “rushed” the legislation.333 Multinational firms all across the world have clamored for 
exemptions from the regulations imposed by SOX.334  These firms requested exemptions from 
certain provisions of SOX such as prohibitions on foreign loans335 and forfeitures by certain 
officers of compensation and securities-related profits.336 Multinational corporations have 
formed the Reciprocity in International Accounting Coalition to “push for changes that affect 
330 148 Cong. Rec. S 7350, 7356 (2002).
331 Id. at 7356 (2002).  Mike Enzi is a senator from Wyoming. Senator Mike Enzi, http://enzi.senate.gov/ (last visited 
Nov. 9, 2005).   
332
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333
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OFII, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, Sec. Exch., Comm’n (August 19, 2002) (on file with the Sec. Exch. Comm’n), 
available at http://www.ofii.org/SEC_Letter_081902.pdf.  OFII is the “leading business association in the United 
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international companies and their corporate officers.”337 A concern for the United States 
securities market is whether the regulation of SOX will have an effect on companies cross-listing 
on a United States exchange and also the influence SOX has on foreign and multinational firms 
when creating models of corporate governance regimes in their respective countries of 
domicile.338
A. The Decision to Cross-List
Cross-listing is the practice where foreign and multinational firms list their companies on 
a United States stock exchange.339  These companies usually cross-list with the aid of American 
Depository Receipts (ADRs), which are a form of derivative securities.340 United States 
depository banks hold foreign securities in custody in the country of origin and convert all 
payments into United States dollars to receipt holders in the United States.  Investors bear all the 
currency risk and pay fees to the depository banks.  Foreign companies must also satisfy two 
requirements to list on a United States exchange.341  The first requirement is to arrange for a 
precise reproduction of settlement facilities as domestic securities with a transfer agent and 
registrar.342 The firm must also register with the SEC.343  To accomplish this, a firm must file a 
337
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registration statement and supply an annual report on a Form 20-F with a reconciliation of 
financial accounts performed under the requirements of GAAP.344
1. Benefits of Cross-Listing
The benefits of foreign and multinational companies cross-listing include “the increased 
ability to raise equity, growth of the firm’s shareholder base, increased liquidity, lower cost of 
capital, and greater visibility and prestige.”345 Another potential benefit for a firm cross-listing 
could be that United States investors would identify which new and innovative firms are likely to 
succeed.346 The cost of listing in the United States, according to reports by managers, is very 
small when compared to the benefits.347 Some scholars contend that “the primary benefit of 
cross listing involves voluntary submission to the U.S. disclosure and liability regimes, which 
may send a signal of firm quality and thereby reduce capital costs.”348 The number of foreign 
and multinational companies cross-listing on a United States exchange has increased 
tremendously since the early 1990’s.349  For example, the number of firms cross-listing on the 
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) had more than quadrupled to 471 firms as of October, 
2002.350
2. Costs of Cross-Listing
344 Id.
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Major costs of listing include “the disclosure standard, the requirement of accounting 
reconciliation, the direct cost in time and money associated with a United States listing, and the 
fear of liability.”351 Whenever the firm wants to buy another company it must follow the United 
States disclosure and procedural rules, rather than the law of their respective country of 
domicile.352 There are costs to list on a United States exchange including a listing fee for 
registration with the SEC and other associated costs for the necessary paperwork.353  Additional 
costs also include “increases in directors’ and officers’ liability insurance, accounting and legal 
fees, and board compensation (as board members are given increased responsibility and may be 
subjected to higher risk).”354 One recent study estimated that “public companies as a group 
would spend $2.5 billion on information technology and related consulting in order to comply 
with the Act’s internal control requirements.”355
3. Effect of SOX on Cross-Listing
SOX has had an effect on the decision of foreign and multinational firms to cross-list on a 
United States exchange.356  There are many companies that are hesitant to cross-list due to the 
regulations imposed by SOX.357 Porsche has decided not to list, citing “problems with Sarbanes-
Oxley, and has announced that it will not change its decision even after the proposed 
exemptions.”358 Companies such as the Benfield Group have chosen to list in London instead of 
listing on a United States exchange stating that the “London Stock Exchange has been quite 
openly using the regulatory hurdles associated with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act as a marketing 
351
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wedge against U.S. registration and listing.”359 The letter, written by the Benfield Group to the 
SEC, also stated that SOX has led to “foreign regulators, companies and media questioning the 
right of Congress to change the rules for non-U.S. listed companies ‘in the middle of the 
game.’”360  William Donaldson, Chairman of the SEC, made the following statement in a speech 
in London:
We also seek to have a listing in the U.S. to signify to investors throughout the world that this 
company is willing to make the investment needed to meet these standards.  Companies who 
choose not to come to the United States may meet those same standards – but our registrants have 
taken the extra step of telling the world that they are up to the challenges that accompany a U.S. 
listing.361
In that same speech, however, he also states “the SEC has worked from its earliest days to 
accommodate foreign issuers” and “The SEC remains committed to a level playing field for all 
its issuers, foreign and domestic alike.”362
B. Influence of SOX on Corporate Governance Standards Worldwide
The success of Sarbanes-Oxley can also be seen in the influence which the Act has had 
on corporate governance standards abroad.  Many countries are using Sarbanes-Oxley as a model 
for implementing their own regulations.363 South Korea has implemented regulations for CEO 
certifications of company financial reports.364 Companies in South Korea must get “CEOs to 
swear to the accuracy of their company's financial statements, to present consolidated financial 
sheets of affiliated firms, and to set up a ‘firewall’, separating auditing and consulting 
businesses.”365 Australia, even after rejecting it at first glance, is now considering using SOX as 
359
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a model and holding executives liable for the credibility of financial statements.366 Canada 
introduced a bill with very similar terms as SOX, but the regulations imposed by the bill are not 
nearly as comprehensive.367 A commentator from the United Kingdom even stated that SOX 
“looks certain to become the benchmark against which every other jurisdiction’s corporate 
governance rules are tested.”368
VI. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, SOX is a very controversial act that has many companies, foreign and 
multinational, asking for relief. SOX was enacted to deter corporate corruption in the United 
States, but has had a global impact.  There are many regulations imposed by SOX that conflict 
with international corporate governance standards and also regulations of individual countries 
outside the United States.  
The extraterritoriality of SOX is a hotly debated topic. It will continue to be until either 
the SEC decides to exempt all foreign and multinational companies listing on a United States 
exchange from regulation or there is a convergence of SOX and international corporate 
governance regulations.  Companies can only look to the legislative history of SOX and past 
decisions to see how SOX may affect them in the future.
The SEC has the power to grant exemptions to foreign and multinational firms, but doing 
so may invoke an outcry from domestic firms.  If the SEC is not applying the same rules, it will
destroy the even playing field that the SEC desired to create by enacting SOX. The effectiveness 
of SOX will be greatly weakened if firms will be exempted form certain regulations, just because 
366 Id.
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they move their headquarters outside of the United States or move a majority of their operations 
outside of the United States.  
Legislation will not be enough, by itself, to swing the pendulum in the right direction. 
Companies, both foreign and domestic, must take personal responsibility in restoring investor 
confidence in the United States securities and capital market and also the global securities 
market.  SOX is a step in the right direction, but companies must do everything in their power to 
deter corruption and restore confidence in markets where there is none.  
